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Abstract 
In policy analysis, the totality of actors involved in the policy process and the relations among them has been referred to as a 
‘policy network’. Despite is intuitive appeal, the insights generated by the concept have been modest. This contribution 
elaborates the complementary notion of ‘coalition networks’ as a way of disaggregating the overall configuration into more 
manageable subunits and thereby gaining increased analytical leverage over output analysis. Particular emphasis is placed on the 
relationship between policy subsystem and coalition network boundaries. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Introduction 
Policy networks entered academic research on policy-making in the late 1970s to reflect a practice of distributed 
government between state and society which despite roots in American politics could be found in different shades 
throughout Western political systems (Heclo, 1978; Kenis & Schneider, 1991; Börzel, 1998; Howlett, 2002; Adam 
& Kriesi, 2007). Mainstream work on policy networks has, partly reflecting an effort to preserve the concept as a 
means of referring to a separate mode of governance, emphasized the aggregate level characteristics of policy 
networks as compared to those of other forms of political organisation, notably as regards the state/society balance 
among constituent actors and the existence of a separate operating logic of networks in contrast to hierarchical and 
market forms of organisation (Kenis & Schneider, 1991; Thompson, 2003; Christopoulos, 2008). A significant 
problem faced by any approach seeking to differentiate between actor constellations in this manner is the relative 
lack of information that these aggregate characterizations convey about the relations among actors and the manner in 
which these affect the policy process. As policy-making in many cases operates in a setting where decisions cannot 
be imposed unilaterally, and the process therefore does not correspond to the hierarchical structure associated with 
the ideal type of bureaucratic organization, insight into these relations becomes a key element in appreciating the 
governance of public policy. The fact that both decision-making rules and considerations of efficacy will often 
incentivize actors to join forces in order to improve the chances of success for their desired policy, highlights the 
need for conceptual tools by which to capture such organizing below the aggregate, but above the individual level. 
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Their function consists in equal parts of enabling more appropriate aggregate level characterizations of actor 
constellations and of providing a better foundation for understanding the dynamics of the policy process through the 
boundedness of their constituents’ relational activities. In response to this perceived need for disaggregation, the 
present contribution proposes such an intermediate level concept in the notion of coalition networks. Coalition 
networks are conceived of as a multi-actor configurations within the wider policy network of a given policy 
subsystem, where a subsystem is understood as the totality of actors actively involved with a particular policy 
problem and its corresponding network as the relations connecting them and selected third parties. The contention 
here is that coalition networks can be meaningfully understood as regions within wider policy networks which may 
reach across subsystem boundaries and whose local properties provide relevant information on action constraints 
that may achieve higher immediate salience than global network characteristics. An empirically grounded 
understanding of coalition networks in terms of their internal and external relational profile thus promises to 
strengthen aggregate interpretations of policy networks and to provide a better appreciation of action flows within 
them. 
The main part of the essay proposes a definition of coalition networks and discusses its various dimensions in 
conceptual and methodological terms. A conclusion briefly outlines how this proposal deviates from alternative 
approaches, and points to new research questions raised by the concept. 
2. Coalition networks: Definition, conceptual and methodological aspects 
Coalitions are commonly understood as ‘temporary alliances of distinct parties, persons, or states for joint action‘ 
(Meriman-Webster Online 2008). Analytically, coalitions are often understood as groups of actors who coordinate 
their actions through collective decisions which determine how to jointly deploy their resources (Coleman, 1970). 
Both approaches suggest a compositional coherence and degree of integration that greatly restricts the range of 
phenomena that from a policy-making perspective may usefully be conceived of as coalitions. The policy network 
literature has drawn attention to the fact that policies often result from the interactions of heterogeneous actor sets 
who are not necessarily unified under one decision-making mechanism. Against this background, a coalition 
network as envisaged here may be defined as: 
 
A set of actors, usually drawn from one policy subsystem, that is internally connected through multiple 
relations in pursuit of agreed policy objectives and exhibits signs of positive internal and negative external 
action coordination. 
 
This definition responds to the variety of possible scenarios in which actors band together in pursuit of common 
objectives by retaining maximum openness to empirical specification. It aims to facilitate the study of the relational 
dimension in policy-making by suggesting the usefulness of treating relational activities guided by a shared purpose 
as networks reminiscent of collective actors, but of a more flexible ilk. Rather than adopting a particular theoretical 
lens to interpret their formation or functioning, the emphasis rests on the empirical identification of these loosely 
structured collectivities and their specific relational properties. Accordingly, the reflections below focus on how the 
definitional elements serve to frame empirical enquiry and highlight selected aspects of empirical measurement and 
explanatory inference to flesh out the concept’s possibilities and limitations in this respect. 
At the conceptual level, the definition combines an actor with a relational element, and places both within a 
subsystem context. Reference to the policy subsystem helps the analysis by directing attention to a relevant actor set 
and creating a first expectation of the likely volatility to be found therein, as it can be developed from a survey of 
subsystem development. Similarly, to stress a specific topical focus gives further direction to the study of coalitions 
by emphasizing that even where these address multiple policy challenges, an analytical treatment needs to separate 
out the relations involved in each of these since differences between relational configurations can influence their 
functioning even when they exhibit a certain stability across problem situations. This delineation has implications 
for both the possibility of inferring the existence of non-obvious policy-making aggregates from the comparison of 
coalition networks, and the comparison of networks across policy subsystems and notably across broader contexts of 
functional differentiation (Benz, 2000). Special conceptual and methodological challenges for network delineation 
arise where relations cross subsystem boundaries. It is these questions which form the focusing lens through which 
the issue of identifying coalition network participants is discussed below. 
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2.1. The actor dimension 
While the actors involved in policy-making activities relating to a specific problem will normally be attached to 
the corresponding subsystem, it is possible for external actors (‘third parties’) to form part of a policy network, 
especially when their involvement confers a strategic advantage on actors in the subsystem who therefore seek their 
cooperation. Importantly, this involvement does not presume a uniform purpose: Actors may accept, or seek, 
participation on the basis of a variety of reasons. As pursuit of objectives relating to the focusing policy subsystem 
would turn third parties into subsystem members themselves, to maintain the possibility of coalition networks 
extending across subsystem boundaries means that the third parties in question have to maintain a position of 
substantive non-involvement. Given the absence of a direct stake in the policy contest itself, how can their inclusion 
into a coalition network be justified? For the actors concerned, possible reasons for their involvement include the 
anticipation of reciprocated support in exchange for the resources that they provide, but also allegiance to certain 
normative ideals which the coalition network is seen to defend. Whatever the actual content of third parties’ 
motivation, their inclusion in the network is warranted on two accounts: In behavioural terms, it makes sense 
because actors commit to behaving in specific ways that, although not inherently prompted by the objectives of the 
coalition network, nevertheless contribute to their attainment; in structural terms, the requisite justification is 
provided by the impact on network configuration. Therefore, a coalition network may comprise multiple, but also 
substantively unrelated policy objectives as long as a common purpose of activity remains discernible, irrespective 
of whether this constitutes actors’ primary or secondary motivation (Methodologically, this implies that coalition 
networks will first have to be identified in terms of relations among actors with shared policy objectives prior to the 
inclusion of third parties. The amount of diversity in objectives that a coalition network can accommodate is an 
empirical question). In either case, it is considered a necessary defining element of coalition networks that this 
shared purposiveness is made explicit, at least between third parties and the actors connecting them to the network. 
This requirement both ensures a firm grounding to their analytical inclusion and sets them apart from other actors 
who share the network’s objectives and take parallel measures, but do so in an uncoordinated manner. Positive 
reinforcement among the different lines of action may still occur, but would appear less likely than inside the 
network. This expectation is expressed by the definition’s reference to elements of positive coordination inside and 
negative coordination towards the outside of the network. Positive coordination means that actors not only act 
towards achieving the coalition’s policy objectives, but do so in a manner that is explicitly coordinated with other 
participants. Negative coordination, on the other hand, entails discrimination against network outsiders in the sense 
that no cooperative relationships will be formed across network boundaries towards the realization of competing 
objectives (For a technical discussion, see Scharpf & Mohr (1994). 
Even when the inclusion of third parties can be conceptually justified in this manner, the question of how to 
achieve this in analytical terms remains. By definition, third parties are embedded in a context that is substantively 
different from that of other coalition network participants. This embeddedness may constitute a distinct resource to 
the network, for example by establishing access to relevant actors to which existing participants are unconnected, 
thus allowing it to remould the relational configuration to enhance its opportunities for action. The associated 
analytical challenge consists in accurately portraying the effect that this has on the relational configuration of both 
the coalition and the wider policy network. The reasons for this are twofold: For one, the amount of additional 
relations to be considered will affect network metrics both at the local and at the global level; second, third party 
embeddedness will influence the strategic opportunities that inclusion is likely to afford the coalition network. The 
latter point is of special importance when considering that the ensuing configuration may diverge significantly from 
what had been envisioned by those actors inside the network pursuing its expansion. Whilst proponents of third 
party involvement may focus on the opportunities associated with specific relations, these might effectively be 
limited or altogether offset by the party’s overall relational embeddedness. The decision on which relationships to 
include in the analysis must thus be answered judiciously based on the specific circumstances of the case, as only 
these can provide necessary information on the relevance of individual relations capable of producing such effects. 
Here the researcher has to address the difficult task of balancing the subjective strategic perspective with a broader 
relational assessment in deciding how to delimit the network for analysis. To render the analytical choices made in 
situations like these as transparent as possible, an explicit, qualitative justification rooted in case specifics should be 
accompanied by a sensitivity analysis for different relational configurations, and the results reported alongside the 
final interpretation adopted. 
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2.2. The relational dimension 
The second major dimension of a coalition network to be discussed here are its relational characteristics and their 
measurement. The definition proposed above requires all participants in a coalition network to form part of the same 
relational configuration, which in turn may form part of, or be identical to the policy network associated with a 
subsystem. This relational emphasis provides a counterpoint to possible alternative definitional approaches focusing 
on parallel action or attitude similarity as the defining characteristics of a coalition. But how is this emphasis to be 
interpreted in practical terms for implementing a research design seeking to trace coalition networks empirically? A 
first step towards clarification is to observe that although the concept expects multiple relationships to obtain among 
those participating in the coalition network, this does not imply that such relations have to exist among all of the 
participants, nor that indeed all of the participants have to be connected to each other. Coalition networks as a 
relational construct must exhibit some minimum degree of integration that enables them to be viewed as a relatively 
coherent set of actors whose actions can be assumed to point in a common direction in pursuit of shared objectives.  
They can thus be understood as interconnected groupings of actors that form a part of, or at most: are equal to, the 
overall population of actors sharing a similar goal orientation.  
One conceivable manner of operationalizing relevant relationships would be the use of a name generator 
explicitly asking respondents to point out those subsystem actors and third parties with whom they enter into a 
coalition. This approach, which has been employed in the context of the study of formal interest group coalitions 
(Heaney, 2006), faces, however, evident problems of validity and respondent bias when there is little or no tradition 
for publicly announcing coalitions, groupings as a rule do not publish information about their activities, and the 
possibilities for triangulation are therefore limited. Such an approach would also be unlikely to reveal information 
about more politically sensitive relations, for example between politicians and interest group organizations, which is 
needed to uncover informal coalition arrangements. Finally, an explicit reference to coalitions may fail to be 
recognized by respondents as an adequate description of the everyday networking and coordinating practices that 
they engage in, and thus lead to their actual prevalence being misrepresented. Besides these methodological 
reservations, this approach to identifying coalition networks is problematic also for the lack of insight it grants into 
the actual operation of these networks since no information is generated on the dimensions along which participants 
interact. It thus fails to take advantage of the unique possibility afforded by network analysis to not only affirm the 
existence of a coalition network and its structure, but also the taking of relational action by its participants.  
To effectively make use of this opportunity requires, however, to generate data on the different activities that 
subsystem participants engage in, such as communication, resource sharing, coordinated action towards third parties 
or other subsystem members, etc. Ensuing data analysis must then be properly attentive to how to evaluate specific 
operationalizations of these relations when assessing their ability to explain observed behaviour in the policy-
making process. A relation of information exchange transporting the same content may thus acquire different 
meanings depending on who the recipient is and at what time the exchange takes place; while information sharing 
would be expected to occur with some frequency among coalition network participants, exchanges with third parties 
would appear to be less so. For the same reason, the interpretation of multiple relations among actors must take into 
account whom they connect and how.  
While generally the existence of more relationships signals a higher degree of integration and suggests stronger 
coordination of action, care must be taken in instrument design to ensure that measures point in the same direction 
before attempts at aggregate-level evaluation are undertaken (Wasserman & Faust (1994) advise against the 
aggregation of multiplex relationships in the absence of strong substantive reasons, without, however, emphasizing 
the issue of effect directionality). In addition to careful specification of expected additive effects of different types of 
relationships, an appropriate assessment of the presence or absence of multiple relationships among coalition 
network participants requires cognizance of the wider conditions shaping coalition operation. These include 
organizational and contractual factors that may obliterate the need for extensive and/or frequent relational action 
being taken among participants, for example because they embed effective signalling mechanisms or ground stable 
expectations towards other participants’ behaviour. What might otherwise be seen to constitute prima face evidence 
of a lack of integration may thus be attributable to alternative devices of coordination instead. Ultimately, the 
integration of a coalition network—and its efficacy—may not depend on the number of relationships among its 
participants as much as on the stability of purpose and clarity of its objectives. 
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3. Conclusion 
This essay suggests a shift of emphasis in the study of policy networks towards a relational ontology which 
stresses the manner in which the configuration of actors seeking to realize objectives relative to a particular policy 
problem affects their opportunities for action. Towards this end, it proposes a concept of coalition networks as a 
means of breaking up policy networks into cohesive subsets bounded by explicitly agreed objectives and certain 
expectations regarding internal and external coordination of participants’ activities. Contrary to formalized 
approaches to the study of coalitions (Roemer, 2001; Borch & Willer, 2006), the present approach does not advocate 
a pre-specification of interaction forms among coalition network participants in any strict sense despite these 
definitional requirements. On the one hand, such pre-specification may unduly constrain the data collection process; 
on the other hand, the perspective set forth here deviates from most formal research in that it occupies itself 
primarily with the methodological identification of existing relational configurations  that can be qualified as 
coalition networks rather than with the question of their formation. From these observations, scholars will then have 
to develop empirically grounded models of how coalition networks maintain a balance between coherence and 
flexibility in pursuing their goals. This will require the emerging practice of studying coalitions from a network 
perspective to broaden its horizon beyond the current emphasis on interest groups and the general question of 
whether relations of joint coalition participation exist, to a differentiated appreciation of the diverse relations that 
constitute coalition networks.  
This broadening of perspective calls for increasing focus on the methodological dimension of coalition network 
identification which takes into account both the specific challenges inherent to the research environment and the 
practical aspects of the data collection process (Kriesi & Jegen, 2000). It also raises a number of research questions 
that the literature on coalitions so far has left largely untouched, such as the relationship between coalition networks 
and the broader policy networks of which they form part; the effects of similar relational configurations across 
policy subsystems; the relative importance of different types of relations in sustaining coalition networks; and the 
role of relational embeddedness in shaping the actions of political actors in the policy process. By bringing into view 
the relation between local and global embeddedness in its various dimensions, the coalition network concept also 
enables policy analysis to re-envision the relation between structure and agency in a manner that promises greater 
descriptive systematicity as well as explanatory leverage. Prospectively, an empirically consolidated line of research 
into coalition networks in the domain of policy-making may provide the basis for comparative investigations of 
similar arrangements in other areas of society, such as business alliances. Moving towards this, the concept can 
promote important insights into how policy decisions are reached given differences in the size, scope and 
configuration of coalition networks, the degree of subsystem permeability, and stability across multiple decision-
making episodes. 
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